DAMPAK DISKRESI PRESIDEN DALAM REHABILITASI PIDANA KORUPSI TERHADAP SISTEM CHECKS AND BALANCES DI INDONESIA

Abstract

Abstrak

Penelitian ini menganalisis dampak penggunaan diskresi Presiden dalam pemberian rehabilitasi terhadap terdakwa atau terpidana korupsi dan implikasinya terhadap sistem checks and balances di Indonesia. Melalui pendekatan yuridis normatif yang memadukan analisis konstitusional, doktrinal, dan studi kasus rehabilitasi terhadap Ira pejabat PT ASDP, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa kewenangan rehabilitasi sebagai bagian dari fungsi administratif Presiden memiliki batas konstitusional yang ketat dan tidak dapat menegasikan rehabilitasi yudisial sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 1 angka 23 KUHAP. Namun, praktiknya menunjukkan potensi perluasan makna rehabilitasi yang membawa risiko intervensi terhadap independensi peradilan, politisasi kewenangan eksekutif, dan melemahnya prinsip separation of powers. Diskresi yang tidak dilembagakan secara ketat dapat menimbulkan detournement de pouvoir serta menciptakan persepsi publik bahwa proses hukum dapat dinegosiasikan melalui kekuasaan politik. Temuan ini menegaskan pentingnya penegakan kontrol normatif dan kelembagaan melalui PTUN, pengawasan legislatif, serta penerapan asas-asas umum pemerintahan yang baik untuk menjaga agar kewenangan rehabilitasi tetap berada dalam koridor negara hukum, tidak mengancam independensi yudisial, dan memperkuat efektivitas sistem checks and balances di Indonesia.

Kata kunci: diskresi Presiden, rehabilitasi, korupsi, checks and balances

Abstract

This study analyzes the impact of the President's discretionary power in granting rehabilitation to defendants or convicts of corruption and its implications for the checks and balances system in Indonesia. Through a normative juridical approach that combines constitutional analysis, doctrinal analysis, and a case study of the rehabilitation of PT ASDP official Ira, this study finds that the authority to grant rehabilitation as part of the President's administrative function has strict constitutional limits and cannot negate judicial rehabilitation as stipulated in Article 1 point 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, practice shows the potential for expanding the meaning of rehabilitation, which carries the risk of intervening in the independence of the judiciary, politicizing executive authority, and weakening the principle of separation of powers. Discretion that is not strictly institutionalized can lead to detournement de pouvoir and create a public perception that the legal process can be negotiated through political power. These findings emphasize the importance of enforcing normative and institutional controls through the State Administrative Court, legislative oversight, and the application of general principles of good governance to ensure that rehabilitation authority remains within the corridor of the rule of law, does not threaten judicial independence, and strengthens the effectiveness of the checks and balances system in Indonesia.

Keywords: presidential discretion, rehabilitation, corruption, checks and balances